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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
A legal but unmarked crosswalk on a State Highway running through the 
city of Nampa was adequate for traffic and pedestrian volumes when it was 
designed in 1954. However, Nampa's population and thus the traffic and 
pedestrian volumes grew substantially over the next 53 years, such that 
pedestrians were struck by vehicles with ever-increasing frequency until, 
following plaintiffs October 2007 accident and another one just a month later, the 
city of Nampa installed warnings consisting of pavement markings, flashing 
amber lights, signs and several other pedestrian safety enhancements. At no time 
did the state make any effort to fulfill its duty to inspect for and correct or warn of 
the conditions that made the unmarked crosswalk unreasonably dangerous to 
pedestrians. Instead it entered into a "joint maintenance agreement" with Nampa 
whereby Nampa was to perform maintenance - but not any necessary 
improvements - to the crosswalk. The lower court granted the state summary 
judgment on the alternate grounds that (a) the "arises out of a plan or design" 
immunity set out in Idaho Code § 6-904 (7) affords the state immunity even for 
subsequent non-design failures to inspect for, find and warn of or correct 
dangerous conditions that come into existence after the location was designed and 
(b) the State's "High Accident Location" program, which merely identifies the 20 
worst locations in the entire state highway system, fulfilled all of the duties it 
owed concerning the highways in its system. This appeal challenges both of the 
lower court's alternate grounds for summary judgment in favor of the state. 
Plaintiff appellant maintains the case doesn't "arise out of' the original plan or 
design at all, but instead arises out of the state's subsequent failure to inspect for 
and correct or warn of subsequently-arising hazards that stemmed from the 
substantially changed traffic and pedestrian volumes flowing through the 
crosswalk. If the lower court's reasoning were accepted, then the state would 
effectively be excused from its continuing duty to inspect, study and correct or 
warn of dangerous conditions on any of the highways in its system so long as the 
highways were designed in accordance with engineering standards - regardless 
of how later demands on the highways might render them unreasonably 
dangerous to the motorists and pedestrians who use them. 
A State Highway designed and built in the mid 1950's runs through the City of Nampa 
with a 35 MPH speed limit. No pavement markings or other warning features were installed at 
one of its legal crosswalks, which exist as a matter of statute. Nampa installed overhead street 
lights along the sides, creating "glare bombs" that make pedestrians using the crosswalk 
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especially hard to see. The population of Nampa grew substantially over the ensuing half-
century, but still no pavement markings or other safety features were installed at the crosswalk. 
By 2007, the frequency of cars hitting pedestrians in or near the crosswalk at night had reached 
seven in five years, counting plaintiff. 
Plaintifftimely filed a notice of tort claim, which the State's "Claims Adjudicator" denied 
on the stated ground 
"The information we have obtained indicates that the State of Idaho has a joint 
agreement with the City of Nampa regarding maintenance of the 11th Avenue 
North in Nampa. The city is responsible for crosswalks and various traffic control 
devices within the City Limits. The only responsibility the State would have 
regarding the City's plans to install a crosswalk would be to review and approve 
the plans to ensure they are in compliance with I [daho] T[ransportation 
D[ epartment] standards. Based upon our review we do not find that the State has 
liability in this matter and must deny the claim." 
(Exhibit H to affidavit of Pat Furey, R., p. 269, emphasis added.) Plaintiff sued the State, by and 
through its Idaho Transportation Board and Transportation Department (hereinafter, collectively, 
"the Department") and Nampa (eventually reaching a settlement with the latter, which has been 
dismissed from the appeal). In the complaint, plaintiff specifically pleaded the authority set out 
in Roberts v. Transportation Dept., 121 Idaho 727, 827 P.2d 1178 (Idaho App.,1991), affirmed, 
121 Idaho 723, 827 P.2d 1174 (1992) i.e., that the State's statutory duties with respect to State 
Highways are non-delegable. He then alleged the State was negligent in its failure to perform 
any engineering studies of the location and to correct or warn of the dangerous conditions such a 
study would have shown. 
The Department then abandoned its claimed "transfer of duty" defense and instead 
asserted that Idaho Code § 6-904(7) ("arises out of a plan or design" immunity) shields it from 
liability. Plaintiff has never contested the adequacy of the original 1954 plan or design, however, 
but attacks the Department's proposition that the adequacy of a design at its inception affords 
4 
infInite immunity for subsequent negligent failure to inspect for, fmd, and implement necessary 
safety improvements, including pedestrian warnings, when changed conditions warrant them. 
In addition, the Department urged its "High Accident Location" program (the effect of 
which was to identify only the 20 worst areas in the State Highway System) excused it, due to 
"funding limitations," from correcting any other defects in its highways. Plaintiff also contests 
this, because the Department's proposition that a claimed "policy" against inspecting for, fmding 
and correcting any but the 20 very worst safety hazards in the State Highway System is 
foreclosed by its statutory duty to inspect for, find and correct safety hazards in all of the 
locations for which it is statutorily responsible. Moreover, the Department offered no evidence 
whatsoever of any "funding limits" that prevented it from inspecting for the hazards that Nampa 
found and fixed itself. 
Finally, given the Department's early and longstanding reliance on its intended handoff of 
responsibility to the City of Nampa (R., p. 269), the appeal presents an urgent opportunity for the 
Court to answer the question it specifically left open in Roberts v. Transportation Dept., 121 
Idaho 727, 732 n. 4, 827 P.2d 1178, 1183 n. 4 (Idaho App.,1991), affirmed, 121 Idaho 723, 827 
P.2d 1174 (1992), i.e., whether the Department lawfully may enlist another entity to help execute 
its own non-delegable duties at all. 
The concise nature of the case, then, is that it is primarily a dispute over the extent of the 
Department's "arises out of a plan or design" immunity: Does the fact a design was in 
accordance with engineering standards or was duly approved when done forever after immunize 
the Department for its subsequent failure to inspect for, find and correct or warn of hazards that 
have arisen over the ensuing decades? Stated another way, it presents for the Court's 
determination the question whether the "perpetual immunity" part or the "governmental liability" 
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part of Leliefeld v. Johnson, 104 Idaho 357, 659 P.2d 111 (1983) controls plaintiffs case as 
plaintiff pleaded it, rather than as the defendant and the lower court re-cast it. 
A secondary aspect of the case is that it presents a dispute as to whether the Department 
can avoid its statutory duty to inspect for, find and correct hazards simply by adopting a 
"program" to look only at the 20 very worst ones in its entire system. 
Course of proceedings and disposition below 
On October 29, 2007, Plaintiff pedestrian was hit and severely injured in an unmarked, 
ill-lighted crosswalk l that presented what is known as a "glare bomb" effect to motorists. He 
was the seventh in five years.2 (R., p. 222.) He timely served a notice of tort claim on both the 
Idaho Department of Transportation (hereinafter, "the Department") and the City of Nampa, 
since the crosswalk was on a State Highway that went through Nampa's city limits. The 
Department's denial of the tort claim by its "Claims Adjudicator" Kim Coffman as quoted 
above, declared that since it had entered into a "Joint Maintenance Agreement" with Nampa, 
then any responsibility for failure to mark, sign or otherwise improve the crosswalk was solely 
Nampa's. 
Upon the denial of his tort claim by both entities, plaintiff sued them (Complaint, R., p. 5 
- 20). The complaint specifically asserted the authority of Roberts v. Transportation Dept., 121 
Idaho 727, 827 P.2d 1178 (Idaho App.,1991), affirmed, 121 Idaho 723, 827 P.2d 1174 (1992), 
which had unequivocally held the duties of the State were non-delegable - a holding the 
1 The existence of a "crosswalk" is determined by statute, I.C. § 49-104(14)(a) and § 49-110 
(10)(a), and not by whether it is painted on the pavement. 
2 About a month later, the eighth one (an elderly woman) would be hit and killed. 
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Department completely ignored in its denial of liability. (Denial of tort claim, R., p. 269.) 
Nampa, on the other hand, claimed it had no responsibility, either, since the joint maintenance 
agreement only required it to maintain - but not improve or correct - that which was already in 
place. In other words, according to the defendants, no one had responsibility for the safety of 
crosswalks on the State's highway through Nampa's city limits. 
Both defendants moved for summary judgment, with the Department basing its motion 
on I.C. 6-904(7) (plan or design immunity) and its "High Accident Location" ("HAL") program 
and Nampa on the fact it was a State highway, rather than a city street. At the hearing, plaintiff's 
counsel focused on his common law negligence claim to the exclusion of his negligence per se 
claim, given the persuasive reasoning of the Washington Court of Appeals in the just-found case 
ofXiao Ping Chen v. City of Seattle, 223 P.3d 1230 (Wash. App. 2009). 
The lower court, in a memorandum decision, granted the motions and entered judgments 
for both defendants. (R., p. 327-354.) Plaintiff timely appealed (R., p. 355-363), following 
which he reached the settlement with Nampa and stipulated to its dismissal from the appeal. 
Statement of Facts 
The subject intersection includes a pedestrian crosswalk as a matter of the law codified at 
I.C. § 49-104(14)(a) and § 49-110 (lO)(a). It was designed by the Department in 1954. 
Affidavit of Kevin Sablan, R., p. 124. The crosswalk remained completely unimproved - that is, 
it had no warnings consisting of pavement paint, "pedestrian crossing" signs, flashers, or 
anything else - for the nextfifty-three years. On October 29, 2007, plaintiff was struck in the 
crosswalk and severely injured. 
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The Department's motion for summary judgment was brought on a perfunctory set of 
facts (R., p. 113-115) which it purported to paraphrase from the allegations of plaintiffs 
complaint. It then concluded: 
"It is the position of [the Department] that despite Woodworth's allegations, it is 
entitled to immunity under the exceptions to governmental liability pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 6-904(7) as the roadway at issue was appropriately designed in 
conformance with the standards at the time [i.e., 1954] and approved in advance 
of construction. Further, the State's monitoring program in place at the time [of 
the accident, i.e., 2007] reflecting accident data for the Intersection and 
surrounding intersections reflected no deviation from any standard, which 
required affirmative action on the part of the State." 
State of Idaho's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 3 (R., p. 115), 
emphasis added. Because the Department's abbreviated paraphrasing of plaintiff's allegations 
was incomplete and misleading in (a) its suggestion that plaintiff was jaywalking instead of 
crossing in a legal albeit unmarked crosswalk and in (b) its attempt to re-cast plaintiff's theory of 
recovery as an attack on the crosswalk's design instead of an attack on the defendant's failure to 
inspect for, fmd and warn of or correct subsequently-arising hazards, they are quoted or 
paraphrased accurately as follows. 
Scene of the Accident. 
At all material times there existed in the State of Idaho and in its municipalities a number 
of roads and highways carrying sufficient traffic volume as to be designated by the Department 
as State Highways and comprising parts of the state highway system. The passage of a segment 
of a State Highway through a municipality at no time vitiated, altered or changed its character as 
a designated State Highway, notwithstanding the popular name of such segment as a street, 
boulevard, avenue or the like. (Complaint, paragraph 4, R., p. 7.) The Department was 
statutorily obligated by Idaho Code § 40-313 (1) to "erect and maintain, whenever necessary for 
public safety and convenience, suitable signs, markers, signals and other devices to control, 
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guide and warn pedestrians and vehicular traffic . . . traveling upon the state highway system." 
(Complaint, paragraph 5, R., p. 7.) 
There existed within the city limits of Nampa a State Highway segment known as 
Eleventh A venue North that ran generally north-south and carried two lanes each direction with a 
turn lane in the center for a total of 5 separate lanes. The segment material to this action was 
cross-intersected on its north end by 4th Street North (a city street that was not part of the state 
highway system) and cross-intersected on its south end by 2nd Street North (likewise a city street 
that was not a part of the state highway system). Adjacent to the segment on its west side was a 
commercial strip mall occupied by Paul's Market (a popular grocery outlet) and a number of 
smaller businesses that shared a large parking lot fronting onto the sidewalk that ran parallel to 
Eleventh Avenue North. Directly east across Eleventh Avenue North from Paul's Market and 
the strip mall was an area consisting almost entirely of residences. This residential area was 
generally bisected by 3rd Street North (still another city street that was not a part of the state 
highway system), which "T"- ed onto Eleventh Avenue North in the middle of the subject 
segment from its east side and opposite the entrance to the Paul's Market parking lot. 
(Complaint, paragraph 6, R., p. 7-8.) An aerial map is attached as Exhibit A for illustrative 
purposes. 
Because the strip mall parking lot exited onto Eleventh Avenue North directly across 
from the entrance to 3rd Street North serving the residences, and because the only through 
intersections (as distinct from the subject "T" one) were a full city block to the north or to the 
south, pedestrians going between the residential area and the strip mall regularly crossed 
Eleventh Avenue North from the parking lot immediately opposite the entrance to 3rd Street 
North. Although this was a legal crosswalk (I.C. § 49-104(14)(a) and 49-110), it had poor 
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lighting, no pavement markings and no traffic warning signals. This lawful but unmarked 
crosswalk had been regularly used by pedestrians for many years before the accident. 
(Complaint, paragraph 7, R, p. 8.) Since the crosswalk was so frequently used by pedestrians 
and because it lacked traffic control devices, warnings or markings; and because the lawfully 
permitted speed in the four main travel lanes of Eleventh Avenue North was fully 35 miles per 
hour, the crosswalk was sufficiently hazardous to public safety as to present the requisite 
"warrants" for a substantially improved pedestrian crosswalk system and enhanced lighting. The 
need for these safety enhancements would have been shown by a competent traffic engineering 
study had the Department caused one to be done. (Complaint, paragraph 8, R, p. 8.) 
On multiple occasions before October 29, 2007, pedestrians using the crosswalk were 
struck and seriously injured by motor vehicles, all of which accidents resulted in accident reports 
duly filed with the Department. (Complaint, paragraph 9, R, p. 8.) At some point prior to 
October 29, 2007, the Department enlisted Nampa to help in the execution of its duties with 
respect to public safety on the subject segment of its highway. This was admitted by the State of 
Idaho in its July 31, 2008 denial of the tort claim (R., p. 269) attached hereto as Exhibit B: 
"Your claim against the State of Idaho filed on behalf of your client, Brian P. 
Woodworth, has been reviewed. 
The information we have obtained indicates that the State of Idaho has a joint 
agreement with the City of Nampa regarding maintenance of the 11 th Avenue 
North in Nampa. The city is responsible for crosswalks and various traffic control 
devices within the City Limits. The only responsibility the State would have 
regarding the City s plans to install a crosswalk would be to review and approve 
the plans to ensure they are in compliance with lTD [the Department] 
standards. " 
(Complaint, paragraph 10, R., p. 9, emphasis added.) 
By October 29, 2007, at 7:34 p.m., no pertinent traffic engineering study had been 
conducted, the crosswalk still had no pavement markings, lights, signs or other warnings to 
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benefit the safety of pedestrians and, except for the dim illumination provided by the lamps 
on nearby poles, it was dark.3 (Complaint, paragraph 12, R., p. 10.) 
The accident. 
On October 29, 2007, at 7:34 p.m., plaintiff left the Paul's Market parking lot pushing 
a shopping cart eastward across Eleventh Avenue North at the crosswalk. As he passed 
the midpoint and approached the nearer of the two northbound lanes, the driver of a 
northbound vehicle saw him and stopped, allowing him to proceed. As he traversed the 
very last of Eleventh A venue North's five lanes, however, the driver of another 
northbound car didn't see him and hit him at about the posted speed of 35 miles per hour, 
causing severe injury. (Complaint, paragraph 13, R., p. 10.) 
The Department's actual and constructive knowledge of 
the hazardous condition of the intersection. 
Not only did the Department have actual knowledge of the hazardous condition of the 
crosswalk from the accident reports required by law to be filed with it, the Department also owed 
affirmative statutory duties pursuant to Idaho Code § 40-310, 40-313,40-502,40-1310,40-312 
(adoption of the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, "MUTCD"), MUTCD § (A) lA-I, 
MUTCD § (C) lA-3, (D) lA-3.l, (E) lA-4, (R) 2C-l and other provisions to inquire, to inspect 
and to cause to be made and kept various surveys, engineering studies, maps, plans, 
3 Worse, the overhead street lights Nampa had installed were of the type that, instead of directing 
their light downward, diffused it outward creating what traffic safety engineers call "veiling 
luminance" or "glare bombs" that make pedestrians even more difficult to see. (Stephen J. 
Lewis, P.E., "11th Avenue Pedestrian Study; Findings and Recommendations" to City of Nampa, 
dated November 23, 2007 -less than a month after the accident. Attachment to Affidavit of 
Kent Fugal (R., p. 66-70.)) 
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specifications and estimates for the alteration, repair and maintenance of state highways (and as 
far as practicable of all highways in the state), and for that purpose to demand and to receive 
reports and copies of records from all other highway officials in the state. (Complaint, paragraph 
17, R., p. 12.) However, because the Department erroneously believed it had legally and 
successfully transferred its pertinent duties completely away from itself by means of the "joint 
maintenance agreement" referenced in its tort claim denial attached as Exhibit B, it completely 
failed to undertake any effort to fulfill its duties concerning the subject segment of Eleventh 
A venue North. Consequently, no competent engineering study was done before plaintiff was 
struck in the unmarked crosswalk. (Complaint, paragraph 18, R., p. 12.) 
Had the Department accepted and fulfilled its duty to apprise itself of the crosswalk's 
hazardous condition and had it done or caused to be done a competent engineering study as 
required, the product of such study would have presented warrants for the installation of a two-
section crosswalk system that would include enhanced overhead lighting and, for each of the two 
halves of the crosswalk, four pedestrian-activated flashing yellow warning lights, two pedestrian-
depicting diamond-shaped warning signs, a safety island in the middle of Eleventh Avenue 
North with a staggered alignment of the pedestrian lanes to require a pause in the island before 
proceeding across the other two traffic lanes and other signs and markings. (Complaint, 
paragraph 19, R., p. 12.) 
The Department having failed to fulfill or even attempt to fulfill its non-delegable 
statutory duties regarding the crosswalk at Eleventh Avenue North, Nampa's Public Works 
Director stepped up to obtain the engineering study that the Department should have performed, 
but only after it was too late to benefit the safety of plaintiff. On November 5, 2007 (just six 
12 
days after the subject accident), Nampa Public Works Director Fuss submitted a "Staff Report" 
to the City Council stating: 
"A serious vehicle/pedestrian accident occurred on the evening of Monday, 
October 29, near the intersection of 11th Avenue North and 3rd Street North. 
Public Works Staff were charged to look into available options for pedestrians at 
the intersection with emphasis on a pedestrian actuated in-pavement flashing 
crosswalk. 
* * * 
Preliminary Finding 
[M]erely painting crosswalks may [actually] increase pedestrian crash risk. (See 
Attachment #4). Therefore, additional treatment is necessary such as traffic 
calming, traffic signals with pedestrian signals, or other substantial crossing 
improvements to improve crossing safety for pedestrians. A review of the 
pedestrian-vehicle accident data over the past four years finds that 7 of 8 
accidents occurred at night indicating that lighting improvements may also be 
necessary. 
Recommendation 
We believe action is warranted to improve pedestrian safety. A pedestrian 
actuated in-pavement flashing crosswalk with overhead flashing beacon may be 
warranted. A raised median with pedestrian safety area in the middle lane may 
also be appropriate. Furthermore, increased roadway lighting may illuminate the 
crossing area and improve overall pedestrian visibility. However, additional 
study is necessary to make the most appropriate decision. It would be tragic to 
make an improvement, though with the right inten[t]ions, that increases the 
pedestrian vehicle accidents. Public Works Staff recommends moving forward in 
making pedestrian safety improvements by reallocating funds from the budgeted 
Cassia Street Project. 
* * * 
The estimated cost for the proposed pedestrian safety improvements is $100,000 
to $200,000. However, funding the project with City funds, and without going 
through the Federal Aid State Transportation Improvement Program (STIP), 
would preclude the City from obtaining any State assistance for the project. 
However, we also must be mindful that 11th Avenue North is a State Highway and 
any improvements funded or not will require the approval ofITD. 
Request 
Authorize the reallocation of budgeted City funds for pedestrian safety 
improvements on 11th Avenue North." 
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Exhibit 7 to Fuss deposition, (R., p. 203-204). 
The request was granted, the traffic safety engineer was engaged (Stephen J. Lewis 
of P.E.C.) and Lewis conducted his 11th Avenue Pedestrian Study, the Findings and 
Recommendations per which were committed to print and provided to Fuss on November 23, 
2007. Lewis's report articulated the deficiencies and the need for their correction as follows: 
"Currently there are no marked pedestrian crossings between the underpass south 
of 1 st Street and the traffic signal at 6th Street. 
Replacement of Existing Light Fixtures 
With 7 out of the 8 pedestrian crashes (in the past five years] occurring after 
dark, one would suspect that street lighting is a contributingfactor. Indeed,!!.!!:! 
study concludes that the existing lighting is deficient. making pedestrians very 
difficult to see at night. 
The existing luminaires have characteristics that are not conducive to lighting the 
actual roadway surface. Most notably, it appears that these fixtures have very 
little light cutoff, meaning the fixtures do not direct light onto the roadway. As a 
result, a good share of light is directed in other directions, which does not help 
light the roadway. In fact, some of the light is directed at drivers, producing a 
glare effect that reduces the contrast of the roadway. The technical term for this is 
veiling luminance. The non-technical term is 'glare bomb.' 
* * * 
We recommend that all of the existing light fixtures along 11 th Avenue North be 
replaced with fixtures similar to those installed on the Kings Comer overpasses. 
The existing concrete and steel poles can remain in place. 
Construction of Enhanced Pedestrian Crossing 
National research has shown that placing [merely] marked crosswalks [alone] at 
uncontrolled intersections on a multi-lane roadways as being more dangerous to 
pedestrians than an unmarked crosswalk. In these cases, some other treatment is 
needed to improve crossing safety for pedestrians. 
To further study the need for some sort of pedestrian facility enhancement, we 
took the raw data from the City's traffic counts and performed a gap analysis. In 
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this analysis we looked to see how many gaps were available in existing traffic of 
sufficient length for a pedestrian to cross 11 th Avenue safely. With 60 feet of 
pavement to cross and an assumed walking speed of 3 feet/second, a gap in traffic 
of 20 seconds or greater is needed to cross 11th Avenue safely. Following is a 
summary of the available gaps observed in traffic during the weekday 5 to 10 PM 
period: [here follows chart of gaps observed in each fifteen-minute period 
between 5:00 and 10:00 p.m.] 
As one would expect. very few gaps are available in the existing traffic stream 
during the early evening, and some sort of enhanced pedestrian treatment is 
needed. 
We recommend that a new crosswalk with pedestrian-actuated (Dush button) in-
pavement flashers and adjacent post-mounted sign and amber beacons be 
installed. Based on observed pedestrian volumes and the origins and 
destinations of pedestrians, our preferred location for this crossing is the south 
side of the 11 th Ave NI 3rd St N intersection. Our next choice if this location 
proves difficult would be the north side of the 11 th Ave N I 2nd St N intersection. 
Either location should provide a safer crossing opportunity for pedestrians in the 
area." (Attachment to Affid of Kent Fugal; Exh 6 to Fuss dep; Exhibit A to Furey 
aff.) 
(R., p. 189-194, emphasis added.) In a News Release issued on December 4,2007 (i.e., just 
over a month after plaintiff was injured), Nampa's Mayor Tom Dale explained the product of 
the belated engineering study as follows: 
"Nampa City Council Adopts Plan for 11 th Ave North Crosswalk 
The Nampa City Council has approved a plan to put in new lighting and a 
crosswalk with flashing lights at 11th Avenue North and 3rd Street North. Public 
Works Director Michael Fuss presented the Council with an engineering study 
showing improvements would greatly increase safety for pedestrians crossing llh 
Avenue North. 
The engineering study . . . revealed street lighting is deficient in this area, 
making pedestrians very difficult to see at night. New lighting fixtures will be 
installed on current poles to improve the situation. The lighting fixtures will be 
similar to those of Kings Overpass. 
The engineering study also showed the amount of traffic on llh Avenue North 
and the speed of the traffic create a situation where there are very few gaps in 
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traffic that allow pedestrians a safe amount of time to cross. A new crosswalk 
with in-pavement flashers will be installed. Pedestrians will push a button to 
activate the pavement lights as well as flashing lights mounted on posts at each 
side of 11 th Avenue North. 
The total cost of the improvements is estimated to be about $140,000. The City 
will still need approval from the Idaho Transportation Department before it can 
move forward with the plan because 11 th Avenue North is a state highway." 
(Complaint, paragraph 20, R., p. 13, emphasis added.) 
In a matter of a few months the city of Nampa had the needed safety enhancements in 
place, a fact the Department admitted in its own press release had been "long anticipated by 
northside residents wanting to safely cross 11 th Avenue South: 
"The lighted crosswalk has long been anticipated bv northside residents 
wanting to safelY cross lfh Avenue North. 
* * * 
The crosswalk is in two sections that don't span the street at the same place. The 
city literally put the crosswalk project on a fast track after several pedestrians in a 
short time period were hit by vehicles while trying to cross the street. Most 
recently, a minivan struck and killed 85-year-old Nampa resident Maria Alvarez 
in March when she attempted to cross the five-lane thoroughfare. Alvarez had 
tried to walk across the street from the Paul's Market grocery store to her home 
nearby. In 2007, a man [plaintiff Woodworth] was severely injured while 
crossing the street. Nine people in the past decade have been injured in the old 
crosswalk." (Exhibit 3 to deposition of Michael Fusst 
CR., p. 151.) 
In his opposition to the Department's motion for summary judgment, plaintiff urged, 
along with the deposition of Nampa's Public Works Director Michael Fuss, the affidavit of his 
expert, Edward Stevens. Stevens opined: 
"Considering a speed limit of 35 m.p.h., 4 or more lanes without a raised median 
and an average daily traffic of greater than 15,000, indicates a marked crosswalk 
4 The Department's press release was made part of the record on the summary judgment 
proceedings as Exhibit C to the Affidavit of Patrick D. Furey (R., p. 185-277), but it appears 
Exhibit C wasn't copied when the clerk's record on appeal was prepared. The press release is in 
the record as a page in plaintiffs brief in opposition to summary judgment, however (R., p. 151). 
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alone is insufficient. Other substantial crossing improvements to Improve 
crossing safety for pedestrians are needed. 
It is unknown within the research conducted to date when 11 th Avenue North was 
constructed to 4 or more lanes, however it has been a number of years since the 
traffic volume exceeded 15,000 vehicles per day. Certainly by year 2002 when 
the aforementioned FHW A study was released the subject intersection met the 
requirements for a marked crosswalk and other substantial improvements. 
Based on my review of all the documents and recognized Engineering Standards 
it is my opinion that 11th Avenue North at its intersection with 3rd Street North 
was not reasonably safe for pedestrians crossings on October 29, 2007 and several 
years prior. I concur with the conclusions of the PEC study and Public Works 
staff as it relates to the need for pedestrian crossing improvements. It is further 
my opinion that as an interim measure the intersection could have been made 
reasonably safe at a much reduced cost by the installation of a median island and 
an advance warning beacon system until such time that a permanent system could 
have been installed. 
Finally, it is my opinion that in the exercise of ordinary care for the safety of 
pedestrians crossing 11 th Avenue at its intersection with 3rd Street, the State of 
Idaho and the city of Nampa should have performed, or caused to be performed, 
prior to the time of this accident, a competent pedestrian safety study of the type 
performed by Stephen J. Lewis ofPEC on November 23,2007." 
Edward Stevens report, attached to his affidavit as Exhibit B. (R., p. 290-291.) 
The Department's breach of its duties and 
causation of plaintiffs brain damage and other injuries. 
The Department's failure to perform any engineering study before the subject accident 
left plaintiff brain-damaged and its failure to act in accordance with what ordinary care 
required in the face of what such engineering study would have shown constituted breaches 
of the duties imposed on the Department by statute and shared by Nampa pursuant to its 
agreement to do so. These breaches and others directly and proximately caused plaintiffs 
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brain damage and other i11iuries because had the study been timely performed as required, the 
product thereof would have disclosed the warrants for the crosswalk system and enhanced 
lighting that more probably than not would have prevented the accident. (Complaint, 
paragraph 21, R., p. 14.) 
ISSUES ON PRESENTED APPEAL 
1. Whether the lower court erred in its application of Idaho Code § 6-904 (7) to this 
case. 
2. Whether the lower court erred in concluding the Department's "High Accident 
Location" monitoring program fulfilled all of its duties concerning the highways in the state 
highway system. 
3. Whether the Department can lawfully enlist the assistance of other highway 
authorities in the fulfillment of its non-delegable duties at all. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The lower court erred in concluding Idaho Code § 6-904 (7) applies to this case. 
A. Contrary to the Department's assertion and the lower court's acceptance of it, plaintiff 
has not based his claim on any attack against the crosswalk's 1954 design. 
The fundamental error into which the Department led the lower court was the conclusion 
that I.C. § 6-904 (7) applies to this case. That section provides: 
A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course and scope 
of their employment and without malice or criminal intent shall not be liable for 
any claim which: 
* * * 
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7. Arises out of a plan or design for construction or improvement to the 
highways, roads, streets, bridges, or other public property where such plan or 
design is prepared in substantial conformance with engineering or design 
standards in effect at the time of preparation of the plan or design or approved in 
advance of the construction by the legislative body of the governmental entity or 
by some other body or administrative agency, exercising discretion by authority to 
give such approval. 
Nowhere in his complaint did plaintiff claim the Department was negligent in its 1954 design of 
the subject crosswalk. Indeed, given the popUlation and traffic volumes of the 1950's, it is 
supposed as an aside that in those days there were probably more than enough gaps between cars 
to permit a pedestrian to cross all five lanes of Eleventh Avenue North safely at its intersection 
with Third Street, even without any of the warnings given by pavement markings, signs or 
flashing lights that draw the attention of motorists to the presence of pedestrians using the 
crosswalk. In its brief in support of summary judgment, however, the Department put enough of 
its "spin" on the case to make it appear that (a) the plaintiff was jaywalking and (b) he was suing 
the Department over its design of the crosswalk. The State offered the innuendo plaintiff was 
jaywalking when he was struck: 
"Just prior to the accident, Woodworth was shopping in Paul's Market, one of the 
aforementioned businesses. As alleged in his Complaint, if a patron leaving 
Paul's intends to cross the street at a crosswalk, he must walk one block in either 
direction. Woodworth alleges that patrons regularly forego walking one block in 
either direction and instead cross directly in front of Paul's, where there is no 
crosswalk. Complaint, Para. 7." 
[Department's] memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment at 2, R., p. 114. 
Plaintiff sought to alert the lower court to the Department's tactic with the following: 
The misdirection fails, though, because: (a) the distinction truly drawn in the 
complaint is the distinction between the through or cross-intersections at Second 
and Fourth Streets and the subject "T" one [fn. 4: Deliberately referred to as "the 
crossing" in the complaint, to avoid precisely the confusion the State would foist 
here.] and (b) legal crosswalks, whether marked or unmarked, signed or unsigned, 
lighted or unlighted, etc., are determined by law, not paint, I.e. § 49-104 (14) (a) 
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and §49-11O (10) (a). The Court is respectfully invited to read paragraphs 7 and 8 
of plaintiffs complaint as they actually are, and to place little stock in the State's 
"paraphrasing" of them. Plaintiff was very much crossing at a legal crosswalk -
notwithstanding the State's failure for the last half-century or so to notice or 
bother with the evolving realities at the subject intersection. 
Plaintiffs brief in opposition to [Department's] motion for summary judgment, etc., at 2, R., p. 
143. From the lower court's discussion of Xiao Ping Chen v. City of Seattle, 223 P.3d 1230 
(Wash. App. 2009), however, it appears it still may not have apprehended that a crosswalk is 
very much a crosswalk regardless of whether it has been treated with pavement markings or any 
other attention-drawing features. In its memorandum decision and order on the defendants' 
motions for summary judgment at 8, it observed: 
[A] major consideration for the Washington appella[te] court was the fact that 
there was an existing crosswalk at the intersection where Chen was struck and 
severely injured. 
* * * 
The court finds the Chen case to be of limited assistance in analyzing the case at 
hand. While the basic facts of the accidents in each case are similar, there are 
differences in both the factual basis for the Washington court's decision and the 
legal authority upon which their decision rests. In this case, the information in the 
record indicates that while the location of Woodworth's accident was commonly 
used by pedestrians to cross 11 th Avenue North, there was not a marked 
crosswalk in that location nor was there lighting or traffic warning signals. It has 
been represented to the court that there were crosswalks at each of the 
intersections in the blocks to the north and the south. 
(R., p. 334, emphasis added.) It is unknown whether the lower court's likely confusion as to 
whether plaintiff was jaywalking or not affected its perception of the case in a material way, but 
its misperception of what plaintiff was suing the Department for surely must have. In its brief in 
support of summary judgment, the Department had characterized plaintiffs claim as follows: 
"In this lawsuit, Plaintiff Brian Woodworth (Woodworth) alleges that [the 
Department] negligently failed to locate, design, construct, install and maintain 
for public convenience and safety that portion of the state highway system known 
as Eleventh Avenue North and, more particularly, the intersection of Eleventh 
Avenue North with Third Street North (hereinafter the "Intersection"). 
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But although plaintiff, in the complaint's paragraph 1 (identifying the Department as one of the 
parties), had indeed enumerated most of those acts5 as ones for which the legislature had 
imposed a duty on the Department, he declared the gravamen of his claim against the 
Department in the complaint's paragraph 21 : 
"DEFENDANTS' BREACH OF THEIR DUTIES AND CAUSATION OF 
PLAINTIFF'S BRAIN DAMAGE AND OTHER INJURIES 
21. 
lTD's failure to peiform any engineering study and Nampa's failure to 
perform one before the subject accident left plaintiff brain-damaged and both 
defendants' failures to act in accordance with what ordinary care required in 
the face of what such engineering study would have shown constituted breaches 
of the duties imposed on ITD by statute and shared by Nampa pursuant to its 
agreement to do so. These breaches and others directly and proximately caused 
plaintiffs brain damage and other injuries because had the study been timely 
performed as required, the product thereof would have disclosed the warrants for 
the crosswalk system and enhanced lighting that more probably than not would 
have prevented the accident." 
(Complaint, paragraph 21, R., p. 13-14.) Plaintiff was not suing the Department for an allegedly 
negligent design - which of course would go nowhere in the face of I.C. § 6-904(7)'s grant of 
perpetual immunity for a claim that "arises out of a plan or design for construction or 
improvement to the highways . . ." He sued it for its failure to perform any engineering study 
and to do what the study, if performed, would have shown to be necessary. As with the 
Department's creation of confusion as to the existence of a crosswalk where plaintiff was 
crossing, plaintiff specifically alerted the lower court to the fact the Department was advancing a 
"straw man" argument that simply didn't jibe with what plaintiff was actually alleging: 
The State's next illusion is to suggest plaintiffs case against it is premised in an 
attack on the plan or design per which the segment was built - back in 1954. Not 
so. Plaintiff has never had any quarrel with the adequacy of the 1954 plan or 
design of the subject road segment and in fact supposes it was a very good plan or 
design. But Nampa then wasn't Nampa now, and what matters now is that in the 
5 "Install" was not among them, whereas "reconstruct," "alter," and "repair" were. 
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late fall of 2007 - when one driver saw plaintiff in the unmarked crosswalk and 
the next one didn't - the traffic volume at this intersection was sufficiently great 
that it worked like the old arcade game of "Frogger." It required some non-
negligent highway safety improvements, inspections and maintenance in the 
exercise of ordinary care for the well-being of people like plaintiff, a thing 
recognized by Fugal's partner Stephen Lewis ofP.E.C. and also Nampa's Director 
of Public Works, Michael Fuss. 
Plaintiff's brief in opposition to state's motion for summary judgment, etc., at 5 (R., p. 153). The 
lower court seemed to acknowledge this ("Woodworth asserts that he does not take issue with 
the 1954 plan or design of the intersection") in its decision at 16 (R., p. 342), but it nonetheless 
bought into the Department's characterization of plaintiff's claim: 
"Here, Woodworth's action arises out of his claims that the State failed to 'locate, 
design, construct, reconstruct, alter, repair or maintain ... a part of the stat[e] 
highway system ... known a[s] Eleventh Avenue North.' (Complaint, [paragraph] 
1 )." 
Memorandum decision and order on the defendants' motions for summary judgment at 17 (R., p. 
343), emphasis added. Again, those were acts for which plaintiff alleged the Department owed 
duties in his identification of the parties, but nowhere did the court address what duties plaintiff 
specifically alleged, in paragraph 21 of the complaint, the Department breached: 
ITD'sfailure to perform any engineering study and Nampa's failure to perform 
one before the subject accident left plaintiff brain-damaged and both defendants' 
failures to act in accordance with what ordinary care required in the face of 
what such engineering study would have shown constituted breaches of the 
duties imposed on lTD by statute and shared by Nampa pursuant to its agreement 
to do so. These breaches and others directly and proximately caused plaintiff's 
brain damage and other injuries because had the study been timely performed as 
required, the product thereof would have disclosed the warrants for the crosswalk 
system and enhanced lighting that more probably than not would have prevented 
the accident." 
(Complaint, paragraph 21, R., p. 13-14.) Instead, the court simply accepted without discussion 
the Department's characterization of plaintiff's claim: 
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"The State relies on Idaho Code 6-904(7) in support of its motion and argues that 
it has governmental immunity from Woodworth's claims because his claims arise 
out of the State's plan and design of the relevant section of 11 th Avenue North." 
Memorandum decision at 16 (R., p. 342), emphasis added. The court then "found" that "this is 
the relevant statutory authority for governmental immunity for this action," id, at 17 (R., p. 343). 
The court then adopted the Department's treatment of the Estate of Wellard v. State, Dept. of 
Transp., 801 P.2d 561 (Idaho 1990), Bingham v. Idaho Dept. of Transp, 786 P.2d 538 (Idaho 
1989), Brown v. City of Pocatello, 229 P.3d 1164 (Idaho 2010) and Lawton v. City of Pocatello, 
886 P.2d 335 (Idaho 1994) (R., p. 17-18), but failed to acknowledge that those cases were 
distinguishable, primarily by the fact they were cases where the plaintiff was specifically 
attacking the design, rather than the Department's failure to study the post-design evolution of 
the actual use of the highway and to warn of the hazards presented thereby. This is odd, because 
that distinction was specifically drawn to the court's attention in plaintiffs opposing brief: 
Nor does the State find any help in the "implications" or "inferences" it 
sees in the Lawton, City of Pocatello, Bingham, and Estate of Wellard cases cited 
in its brief. Its cries for immunity are wholly inapposite because plaintiff isn't 
suing it for any allegedly negligent plan or design of the segment back in 1954. 
Plaintiff is suing it for its negligent operational failure to inspect, improve and 
maintain the segment to meet the pedestrian safety issues that evolved with the 
traffic volume and the frequency of the crosswalk's use to access the nearby 
businesses. Lawton was a case where the plaintiff specifically based his case on 
the premise the highway was negligently designed; plaintiff makes no such 
contention here. Lawton held simply that the "plan or design" immunity made 
available by I.C. 6-904(7) presented ajury question in that case. Lawton's only 
applicability here is for the proposition that evidence of prior accidents is 
admissible. City of Pocatello likewise involved a challenge to the adequacy of 
the original plan or design and, more specifically, the question whether the city 
had to prove it acted in accordance with the challenged plan - neither of which 
issues obtains in this case. Roberts has already been addressed above; it destroys, 
rather than supports, the State's motion. Bingham was another case in which one 
of the plaintiffs claims was specifically for allegedly negligent plan or design; 
summary judgment on that issue was reversed. Summary judgment on the claims 
that at least resemble some aspect of those at bar - negligent failure to inspect and 
maintain - was affirmed, but only because the plaintiff there had failed to 
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adduce any evidence to support the claim. Here, plaintiff !!1£!Y. all the evidence 
on that issue because it's been handed to him on a plate via the defendants' own 
documents, the testimony of Michael Fuss (Nampa Public Works Director), the 
Pedestrian Study authored by p.E.eo's Stephen J. Lewis (attached to his partner 
Kent Fugal's own affidavit in this case) and the State's own press release. 
Bingham indeed. Wellard is dispatched by the mere quotation of the State's 
assertion of it: 
"[Wellard] merely affirms the inference that I.e. § 6-904(1) 
applies only if there is no plan or engineering standards at issue. 
Although lTD's . . . summary judgment was reversed, Wellard 
implies that had I.e. § 6-904(7), not (8), been in effect, summary 
judgment may have be proper (because the dual requirement under 
(8) had been replaced [by] the either-or test under (7))." 
State's Brief at 7, emphasis added. This is scarcely authority for immunizing the 
governmental entity that acted in accordance with its dead-wrong belief that by 
enlisting Nampa to mind its highway, it was thus entitled to wash its hands of its 
non-delegable responsibilities. Roberts rules this case. 
Plaintiffs brief in opposition to state's motion for summary judgment at 17-119, R., p. 164-166. 
Thus, it simply can't be said - as the Department has said and as the lower court has 
accepted - that plaintiff in this case has alleged any deficiency in the 1954 design of the subject 
crosswalk. Quite to the contrary, he has declared over and over that he has no quarrel with the 
adequacy of the design that was done in 1954. His quarrel is with the fact the realities of the 
highway's use over the ensuing half-century changed, resulting in a hazardous condition that an 
engineering study would have shown had the Department done one, as required by statute and by 
ordinary care, and which dangerous condition it should have fixed or warned against. The 
Department's attack on plaintiffs case - declaring plaintiffs claim is based on the Department's 
design and is thus subject to I.e. § 6-904(7)'s provision of immunity - is no more legitimate than 
if it were to assert that plaintiffs claim is based on a 1954 injury and is thus barred by the statute 
oflimitations. It constitutes a classic "straw man" attack. 
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B. "Plan or design immunity" does not shield highway authorities from liability for 
post-design failures to inspect for, find and ilX or warn of dangerous highway defects. 
With the Department's strawman characterization of plaintiffs allegations exposed, a 
second, more difficult, question is presented: Does § 6-904(7)'s perpetual "plan or design 
immunity" attach - immutably and without regard to subsequent breaches of duty - to every 
highway authority that designs a highway in accordance with the engineering standards6 in effect 
at the time? Inasmuch as plaintiff here simply isn't contending there was anything wrong with 
the 1954 design, he submits the only way "plan or design immunity" can be forced onto the case 
is by sophistry on the order of the following: 
"The crosswalk was designed [in 1954] without pavement markings or other 
warnings. Plaintiff contends the crosswalk should [in 2007] have pavement 
markings and other warnings. Therefore, plaintiff is attacking the no-warnings 
design ofthe crosswalk. Idaho Code § 6-904(7) affords immunity for a claim that 
arises out of the plan or design. Therefore, the Department enjoys immunity 
against plaintiffs claim." 
If this reasoning were valid, then any highway authority that produced a design which 
was adequate at the time of its creation could never be held liable for a subsequent failure to 
inspect for, find and warn of or correct aspects of the highway that had, over time, become 
unreasonably dangerous to its users. It is submitted that this outcome would be irreconcilably at 
odds with the purpose and intent ofLC. §§ 40-201, 40-310(6) and 40-313(1): 
LC. §40-201: There shall be a system of state highways in the state, a 
system of county highways in each county, a system of highways in each highway 
district, and a system of highways in each city, except as otherwise provided. The 
improvement of highways and highway systems is hereby declared to be the 
established and permanent policy of the state of Idaho, and the duty is hereby 
imposed upon the state, and all counties, cities, and highway districts in the state, 
6 The Department and the lower court spent some time insisting on the importance of the statute's 
evolution to provide immunity for designs done either in accordance with engineering standards 
or (instead of "and") that were approved in advance of construction by the appropriate legislative 
or administrative authority. Plaintiffhas never disputed the disjunctive nature of subsection (7). 
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to improve and maintain the highways within their respective jurisdiction as 
hereinafter defined, within the limits of the funds available. 
I.C. §40-31O(6): The board shall ... Cause to be made and kept, surveys, 
studies, maps, plans, specifications and estimates for the alteration, extension, 
repair and maintenance of state highways, and so far as practicable, of all 
highways in the state, and for that purpose to demand and to receive reports and 
copies of records from county commissioners, commissioners of highway 
districts, county engineers and directors of highways and all other highway 
officials within the state. 
I.C. §40-313(1): The board shall ... Furnish, erect and maintain, 
whenever necessary for public safety and convenience, suitable signs, markers, 
signals and other devices to control, guide and warn pedestrians and vehicular 
traffic entering or traveling upon the state highway system. 
Plaintiff submits this case is controlled by Leliefeld v. Johnson, 104 Idaho 357, 659 P.2d 111 
(1983), and that when plaintiffs actual theory of recovery (rather than the one attributed to him 
by the State and the lower court) is in focus, the reasoning of Leliefeld requires reversal of the 
Department's summary judgment. 
Leliefeld was factually similar: A narrow bridge on a State highway, designed and built 
in accordance with then-current engineering standards in 1937, had no warning signs concerning 
the bridge width. 659 P.2d at 115. By 1975, there had been a substantial increase in the amount, 
speed and type of traffic using the bridge since it was first constructed; there had been several 
other accidents and frequent collision damage to the bridge and the State was aware of these 
accidents and the frequency of the collisions. 659 P.2d at 121. Plaintiff was injured when, 
driving a truck over the bridge at the same time it was occupied by an oncoming one, the two 
collided. He sued the State on the theory that the bridge in question was dangerous at the time of 
the accident, that the State knew it was a dangerous condition and yet failed to correct the 
dangerous condition, either by reconstructing the bridge or by warning of its characteristics. 
659 P.2d at 117. 
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Plaintiff concedes application of Leliefeld to this case requires some massaging, because 
the Court there dealt with both the issue of "discretionary function" immunity pursuant to I.C. § 
6-904(1) (which the Department hasn't raised here) and "plan or design" immunity pursuant to 
I.C. § 6-904(8)7, and plaintiff here seeks to avail himself of Leliefeld's treatment of both. He 
maintains the Court's rationale for refusing subsection (1)'s discretionary function immunity (i.e., 
that plaintiffs theory was a failure to warn, which was different from an attack on statewide 
standards) is equally applicable here, since Woodworth isn't attacking the Department's design at 
all, but rather its failure to inspect for, find and correct or at least warn of known dangerous 
conditions. He further maintains, however, that this Court's treatment of "plan or design" 
immunity in Leliefeld (i.e., although plan or design immunity is perpetual, it doesn't apply to a 
negligent failure to warn) is directly on point. The net effect of the Court's disposition of both 
issues is that, although immunity for design (whether by "discretionary function" immunity for 
promulgation of the standards per which the highway/bridge is designed and built or whether by 
explicit "plan or design" immunity per subsection (7)) is perpetual and immutable, it simply 
doesn't attach to liability for other torts, such as a negligent failure to find out about and warn of 
known dangerous conditions that subsequently come into being. As respects the inapplicability 
of discretionary function immunity, this Court dispatched a "straw man" approach much like the 
one the Department employed against Woodworth here: 
We have considered this exemption from liability [i.e., that afforded by 6-
904 (1)] in three other cases- McClure v. Nampa Highway District, 102 Idaho 
197,628 P.2d 228 (1981), Gavica v. Hanson, 101 Idaho 58, 608 P.2d 861 (1980), 
and Dunbar v. United Steelworkers of America, 100 Idaho 523, 602 P.2d 21 
(1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 983, 100 S.Ct. 2963, 64 L.Ed.2d 839 (1980). In 
McClure and Gavica, we considered the application of the discretionary function 
exception with regard to actions which alleged negligence on the part of a 
governmental entity in maintaining or failing to warn of a known dangerous 
7 Now codified as subsection (7). 
27 
condition in or on a public highway. McClure and Gavica make it clear that the 
State is not immunized from liability when with respect to a public highway, the 
State maintains a known dangerous condition on the highway and fails to properly 
warn motorists of such a condition. 
The State responds to McClure and Gavica by asserting that bridges are 
signed according to statewide standards promulgated by the Idaho Transportation 
Department. According to the State, the formulation of criteria governing the 
signing of bridges occurs at the state level and has no parallel in the private sector. 
The State directs our attention to plaintiffs' exhibit 58, a document delineating 
certain signs to be placed on various types of bridges. This document was 
formulated after four to five years of study by the state traffic engineer's office. 
The State argues that this is evidence that the decision to sign or not sign bridges 
is made at the state level for all of the bridges in this state and therefore has no 
parallel in the private sector. This would be cogent to our deliberations, if the 
theory upon which this case was tried was that these statewide signing and 
striping standards were inadequate, negligently promulgated or a cause of the 
accident. In such a case, the discretionary immunity accorded the State by I.C. § 
6-904(1) would apply. However, this case was tried upon a different theory that 
this particular bridge was dangerous at the time of the accident, that the State 
knew that it was a dangerous condition, and yet failed to correct the dangerous 
condition, either by reconstructing the bridge or by warning of its characteristics. 
We are not persuaded that McClure and Gavica were wrongly decided or should 
not be applied. The declaration and existence of statewide standards are not 
talismanic and do not provide immunity from liability for breach of a duty to 
make safe or warn of known dangerous conditions on public highways. 
Lelieftld v. Johnson 104 Idaho 357,362-363,659 P.2d 111, 116 - 117 (1983), emphasis added. 
Accordingly, it matters that plaintiff here pleaded his theory of recovery as he did - instead of 
the way it was reworked by the Department and the lower court - and the rationale for denying 
subsection (I)'s discretionary immunity should apply to subsection (7)'s plan or design immunity, 
as well. 
In its rejection of subsection (7)'s plan or design immunity, as well, this Court in Leliefeld 
rejected the plaintiffs contention that subsequently adopted standards should be admitted to 
show the Department's awareness ofthe bridge's evolution from a safe one to a dangerous one as 
the result of substantially increased amount, speed and type of traffic. It specifically held, in 
fact, that the design immunity afforded by what is now subsection (7) is perpetual and unaffected 
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by changed circumstances that might eventually make the design inadequate. 659 P.3d at 123. 
However, the Court took pains to distinguish one aspect of plaintiff Leliefeld's case from the 
two California cases it found persuasive in arriving at that holding: 
California in 1963 appears to have been the fIrst state to enact a design 
immunity statute (current version Cal. Gov't. Code § 830.6 (West 1980)) based 
upon the standards as of the time of construction. [footnote omitted.] In fIrst 
construing § 830.6, the California Supreme Court held that passage of time and 
change of conditions did not diminish the immunity granted by the statute. Becker 
v. Johnston, 67 Ca1.2d 163,60 Cal.Rptr. 485, 430 P.2d 43 (1967), Cabell v. State, 
67 Ca1.2d 150, 60 Cal.Rptr. 476, 430 P.2d 34 (1967). In Cabell a glass door had 
been originally designed in accordance with the then contemporary standards. A 
student injured by the door was not permitted to sue the State for defective design 
even though other students had been previously injured on the same door and 
even though the then current design standards called for a different type of glass. 
In Becker a highway intersection was designed in 1927 and completed in 1929. A 
motorist injured in a 1963 accident was held to have no cause of action against the 
State even though under changing conditions the intersection was not designed in 
accordance with engineering standards of the 1960's, and even though the 
intersection had been the scene of numerous accidents. In neither Cabell nor 
Becker did the plaintiff present as a theory of liability a failure of a duty to 
warn. 
Leliefeld v. Johnson, 104 Idaho 357,367-368,659 P.2d 111, 121 - 122 (1983), emphasis 
added. Finally, the Court reiterated the statement emphasized immediately above, presumably to 
ensure the force and gravity of its declaration of "perpetual" design immunity wouldn't be "over-
interpreted" to suggest some subsumption of liability for other lapses into immunity for design 
decisions: 
The construction we place upon § 6--904(8) does not preclude a fmding of 
liability founded upon a failure to warn of a dangerous condition. McClure, 
supra; Gavica, supra. 
104 Idaho at 369, 659 P.2d at 123, emphasis added. For these reasons and those articulated by 
the Washington Court of Appeals inXiao Ping Chen v. City o/Seattle, 223 P.3d 1230 (2009), the 
Court should hold § 6-904(7) inapplicable to plaintiffs claims, which were for the Department's 
subsequent negligent failure to inspect the situation by conducting the appropriate engineering 
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studies (such as the one Stephen J. Lewis performed and signed off on less than a month after 
plaintiff was hit, R., p. 222-226) and to place pavement markings, flashing beacons and 
"pedestrian crossing" signs - i.e., warnings - at the crosswalk once the danger materialized due 
to the increase in traffic volumes. The lower court's entry of summary judgment for the 
Department should be reversed and the case remanded for trial. 
2. The lower court erred in concluding the Department's "High Accident Location" 
monitoring program fulfilled all of its duties concerning the highways in the state highway 
system. 
Whereas the correct application of Lelieftld does take some thought, the lower court's 
adoption of the Department's "High Accident Location Program," as an alternative ground for 
summary judgment, is so analytically empty as to make its rejection self-evident. It must fIrst be 
noted that the entirety of the actual record on the issue consists of (1) the affIdavit of Kevin 
Sablan, a Department staff engineer (R., p. 123-133) and (2) the affidavit of the Department's 
counsel (R., p. 87-112). All in the world the Sablan affidavit offers on the issue is in its 
paragraphs 7, 8 and 9: Once a year he gets reports that identify "the top 20 locations on the 
State Highway system with potential safety defIciencies within District 3" (paragraphs 7 and 8) 
and the subject crosswalk wasn't on the list (paragraph 9). That's it. There is nothing even to 
suggest that the Department limits its engineering studies or warning activities or repair activities 
to just the 20 worst locations in the State. There is nothing even to suggest that the ordinary care 
of a highway authority, Xiao Ping Chen v. City of Seattle, 223 P.3d 1230 (2009), requires only 
that it perform engineering studies, perform warning activities, or perform repair activities on 
just the 20 worst locations in the State. There is nothing even to suggest what the State's 
"funding limitations" are. There is nothing even to suggest what it costs to do - something, 
presumably, we aren't told what - with the 20 worst locations in the State. And there is nothing 
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even to suggest how the "High Accident Location Program" has anything whatsoever to do with 
this case. For all that appears in the Sablan affidavit, the "top 20" locations might have required 
nothing more than the installation of 20 cheap stop signs. 
The affidavit of the Department's counsel has no more substance that Mr. Sablan's, either. 
It simply attaches a document that details the methodology by which these "top 20" locations are 
scored. That's it. Nothing about what will or won't be done with them; nothing about what it 
will cost to do whatever will be done with them; nothing about what the Department's "funding 
limitations" are; nothing about how, if at all, it relates to what ordinary care requires of a 
highway authority, Xiao Ping Chen v. City of Seattle, 223 P.3d 1230 (2009) - nothing of any 
substance. And yet, the lower court supposed those feathers could be made to carry these heavy 
loads: 
"The State acknowledges that it is responsible for the State Highway system 
pursuant to Idaho Code 40-201 which states: 
State highway, county highway, highway districts and city 
highway systems established 
There shall be a system of state highways in the state, a system of 
county highways in each county, a system of highways in each 
highway district, and a system of highways in each city, except as 
otherwise provided. The improvement of highways and highway 
systems is hereby declared to be the established and permanent 
policy of the state of Idaho, and the duty is hereby imposed upon 
the state, and all counties, cities, and highway districts in the state, 
to improve and maintain the highways within their respective 
jurisdiction as hereinafter defined, within the limits of the funds 
available. 
I.C.40-201. 
In order to comply with this statutory mandate,8 the State has established 
the High Accident Location program. The affidavit of Counsel provides a copy of 
8 This has no basis in the record whatsoever. 
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the HAL methodology protocol for the court.9 The court has reviewed that 
protocol and it appears to the court that it is a thorough and complicated 
analysis that is completed by the State with regard to potentially dangerous 
locations on the State Highway System. 10 
The Sablan Affidavit states that as the [sic: "a"] District 3 Traffic Engineer 
for lTD he receives yearly reports from the HAL program which identifies the top 
20 locations within District 3 that have been identified as having potential safety 
deficiencies. He then states that prior to Woodworth's accident 'none of the 
intersections on Eleventh Avenue North between First Street North and Sixth 
Street North in Nampa, Idaho were on the District 3 HAL listing.' (Sablan 
Affidavit, para. 9).11 The court finds additional support for the State's arguments 
in the Fugal affidavit. In his report, Fugal states that he has reviewed the accident 
reports for the time period between 2003 and 2006 and he notes that of the seven 
prior pedestrian and/or bike collisions with motor vehicles, only two of those 
accidents had characteristics that would indicate that the accidents were 
potentially avoidable if there had been an enhanced crossing at the location of 
Woodworth's accident. 12 Thus, the State argues that to the extent it had a duty to 
Woodworth, that duty has been fulfilled by the HAL program and that summary 
judgment should also be granted on that basis. 
To the extent that Woodworth addresses this element of the motion for 
summary judgment in his briefing, he simply states that the State had a non-
delegable duty to [inspect for, fmd, and fix or warn of dangerous conditions] and 
that it was negligent in failing to identify problems with this intersection and to 
9 And not one thing more. 
10 This may be, but it still doesn't fill any of the voids mentioned above. 
11 Both of these statements are correct, but neither of them is ever connected up, in any fashion 
whatsoever, to anything in the case. 
12 Here, the lower court presumes to try an issue of fact and decide it for the Department, 
ignoring the affidavit and report of plaintiffs expert, Edward Stevens and the conclusions of 
both Nampa's retained consultant P.E.C. and its Public Works Director: "Certainly by year 2002 
when the aforementioned FHW A study was released the subject intersection met the 
requirements for a marked crosswalk and other substantial improvements. Based upon my 
review of all the documents and recognized Engineering Standards it is my opinion that 11 th 
A venue North at its intersection with 3rd Street North was not reasonably safe for pedestrians 
crossings on October 29,2007 and several years prior. I concur with the conclusions of the PEC 
study and the Public Works staff as it relates to the need for pedestrian crossing improvements. 
* * * Finally, it is my opinion that in the exercise of ordinary care for the safoty of 
pedestrians crossing 11th Avenue at its intersection with 3rd Street, the State of Idaho and the 
City of Nampa should have performed, or caused to be performed, prior to the time of this 
accident, a competent pedestrian safety study of the type performed by Stephen J. Lewis of P EC 
on November 23,2007." (R., p. 290-291, emphasis added.) 
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expend the funds requried to fix those issues.13 Woodworth appears to disregard 
the portion of LC. 40-201 that limits the State's duties under that code section to 
the extent that funds are available to address such issues. 14 In addition, 
Woodworth does not directly address the issue addressed by Sablan in which he 
states that this location has not be[ en] identified as a highly dangerous 
intersection, rather Woodworth seems to simply rely on his assertions that 
accidents had occurred in that location and again, that the City of Nampa chose to 
make modification to this intersection[] within a matter of weeks after 
Woodworth's accident.1s 
The court fmds that the State has provided an adequate record that it has a 
monitoring system in place through the HAL program and that this likely satisfies 
the duties it owes pursuant to Zc. 40-201. 16 In addition, the court does not fmd 
that Woodworth has raised a genuine ~uestion of fact as to whether or not the 
State complied with its own program} for this particular intersection or that it 
has otherwise been negligent in light of the limitations as to fundini8 that is 
built into the duties imposed by I.C. 40-201. Thus, the court will grant the State's 
motion for summary judgment on this issue. 
Memorandum Decision and Order on the Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment at 20-22, 
13 That is because the Court in Roberts v. Transportation Department, 827 P.2d 1178 (Idaho 
App. 1991) held: "[W]here, as here, the legislature enacts a statute requiring that an 
administrative agency carry out specific functions, i.e., furnish, erect and maintain signs on side 
highways, that agency cannot validly subvert the legislation by promulgating contradictory 
rules." 827 P.2d at 1182-1183. "[A]n administrative agency may not alter, modify or diminish 
its statutorily-imposed responsibilities, either unilaterally or through agreement with another 
public or private entity, absent legislative authority to do so. Thus, the fact that the ACHD has 
assumed part of the Department's legal obligations might affect the rights and liabilities between 
the Department and the ACHD. However, such an agreement between these two entities does 
not alter the statutory duty owed by the Department to the Roberts." 827 P.2d at 1183, emphasis 
original. 
14 No, Woodworth elected not to disregard the fact the Department hadn't adduced one shred of 
evidence that even touched on cost, funding or funding limitations. 
15 No, Woodworth relies on the fact there had been numerous accidents in a short period of time 
and that the engineering study done within a matter of weeks after the accident identified the 
dangerous condition and a recommended cure. 
16 Again, the lower court is impermissibly trying a question of fact for the jury here. 
17 An "issue" that was nowhere raised. 
18 Again, a skyhook supposition that has no basis in the record. 
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R., p. 346-348, emphasis added. 
The lower court's alternate ground for granting the Department summary judgment, i.e., 
that its adoption of the "H.A.L." monitoring program fulfilled or avoided all of the Department's 
duties concerning the highways in the state highway system, is clearly erroneous and cannot be 
upheld. 
3. This Court should declare the Department prohibited from enlisting another entity 
to help execute its duties. 
In Roberts v. Transportation Dept. 121 Idaho 727, 732, 827 P.2d 1178, 1183 (Idaho 
App.,1991), affirmed, 121 Idaho 723, 827 P.2d 1174 (1992), the Department had attempted to 
transfer to a county-wide highway district its duties pertaining to the placement of stop warnings 
on side roads intersecting with a state highway. As here, neither entity followed through and a 
serious accident resulted. The Court held the Department could not thereby avoid liability, but 
left for another day the question whether it could lawfully even enlist the other entity's 
assistance: 
Nor do we believe that judicial observance of the Department's statutory duty-to 
place necessary signs and conduct maintenance activities outside of its right-of-
way-need result in the administrative confusion feared by the district court. Only 
the Department has the statutory duty to ensure that side-road traffic comes to a 
stop before crossing a through highway. To the extent that the Department 
lawfully enlists another entity to help execute its duties,FN4 the primary 
responsibility to see that the obligation is fulfilled remains with the Department. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred when it determined that the 
Department had no legal duty to conduct any activity outside of its right-of-way. 
FN4. Whether the Department lawfully may do so [at all] is not an issue 
presently before this Court. [Emphasis added.] 
Roberts v. Transportation Dept. 121 Idaho 727, 732, 827 P.2d 1178, 1183 (Idaho App.,1991), 
ciffirmed, 121 Idaho 723, 827 P.2d 1174 (1992), emphasis added. Given the Department's 
continuing reliance on an attempted to transfer its obligations to the City of Nampa over a decade 
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later in this case (R., p. 269), it may be time to foreclose the practice of "joint agreements" 
between highway authorities. What seems to be happening is that when one agrees to "share" the 
responsibilities of another for highways in the other's jurisdiction, neither one is as diligent in the 
fulfillment of those duties as it would be if it had no one else to blame. The practice should be 
halted by this Court. 
Conclusion. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the entry of summary judgment for the Department must 
be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted thiS~~ ember, 2011. 
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